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1983-84 SEVENTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE
SHERMAN ACT, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND RES
JUDICATA
During the 1983-84 term, the Seventh Circuit dealt with a great va-
riety of antitrust issues. In the areas of per se and rule of reason applica-
tions, tying arrangements, price discrimination and res judicata of
antitrust claims, the court set new and significant trends for the circuit.
I. SHERMAN ACT § 1 VIOLATIONS
There are three criteria that must be met in order for an activity to
be deemed illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' First, there must
be some form of concerted action. Second, there must be a restraint of
trade or commerce. And third, there must be an interstate commerce
nexus.2 Each of these factors was the subject of controversy in the 1983-
84 term and will be discussed below.
A. Conspiracy
The first element of a Sherman Act § 1 violation was found lacking
in O'Byrne v. Cheker Oil Co. 3 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's summary judgment in defendants' favor.4 The plain-
tiffs alleged that the two defendant oil companies, Cheker and Marathon,
conspired to drive their independent dealers out of business by increasing
their operation costs, and thereby converting all retail operations to ex-
clusive company control.5 Although it did find that Cheker had taken
steps to implement the scheme, the court refused to find that Marathon
* B.A. Anthropology, Vassar College, 1981; Candidate for J.D., I.I.T. Chicago-Kent College
of Law, June, 1987.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal . ...
3. 727 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1984).
4. Id. at 162.
5. Id.
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had taken any part. 6 Therefore, because there was no concerted action,
there was no conspiracy.
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit accepted the affida-
vits and deposition testimony offered by Marathon which demonstrated
that it played no part in Cheker's conversion from wholesale to retail
operations.7 In so doing, they rejected the inference of conspiracy which
the independent dealers attempted to establish from the fact that Mara-
thon owned 50% of Cheker's stock.8 Basically, the court was looking for
some direct evidence which would refute defendants' affidavits and testi-
mony by proving that responsibility for Cheker's day-to-day operations
was jointly within the control of Cheker and Marathon officials. 9 How-
ever, because no such direct evidence was found in the record, the sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants was affirmed.
O'Byrne is not the first case in which the Seventh Circuit refused to
infer a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence. Rather, O'Byrne is in
line with several cases decided in previous Seventh Circuit terms which
have indicated that, absent an overwhelming showing of parallel behav-
ior or other circumstances indicating a common purpose, the court will
not infer a conspiracy. For instance, in Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. All-
state Insurance Co.,1o the court refused to find a price-fixing conspiracy
between two defendant insurance companies. These companies each es-
tablished a method for estimating the amount of money it would pay to
repair damage covered under their policies. "1 The plaintiff requested the
court to infer a conspiracy on the ground that the defendants adhered to
a common formula for calculating these repair estimates. t 2 Nevertheless,
the argument seeking to establish a conspiracy by inference was found
6. Id. at 164.
7. Id. at 162. For instance, the manager of Marathon's wholesale marketing division stated in
an affidavit that "Marathon has never agreed or conspired with Cheker in any way to unlawfully
restrain trade. ... Id. at 163.
8. There were only two facts illuminated in the opinion which could conceivably lead to a
conspiratorial link between the parties: (1) that both defendants sell gasoline, and (2) that Marathon
acquired 50% of Cheker's outstanding stock. Id. at 162. The court was apparently referring to this
circumstantial evidence when it stated that "the facts upon which plaintiffs rely to support their
Sherman Act conspiracy allegations are not susceptible of the interpretation they seek to give them."
Id. at 163.
9. The court stated that the plaintiffs were unable to "substantiate" their claims of conspiracy
and that they had no "evidence" of a conspiracy. Id. at 163. However, if the plaintiffs had been able
to demonstrate that Cheker's policies were implemented in the normal course of business only after
joint approval by Cheker and Marathon management, then summary judgment may have been
found inappropriate since "evidence" of concerted action could thus have been presented at trial.
10. 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
11. Id. at 1197-98.
12. Id. at 1200. In other words, the plaintiff argued that use of a similar formula constitutes
parallel behavior sufficient to establish a conspiracy. Id. at 1200-01 (the assumption being that two
parties could not independently develop the same procedure).
ANTITRUST
unpersuasive in Quality Auto for the same reason that it was found un-
persuasive this term in O'Byrne-uncontroverted affidavits and testi-
mony were offered by the defendants stating that they had not
conferred. 13
O'Byrne is also consistent with United States v. Standard Oil Co. ,t4
which was decided during the Seventh Circuit's 1963-64 term. In Stan-
dard Oil, another form of parallel behavior was found insufficient to es-
tablish a conspiracy. Defendant gas companies raised their prices after
defendant Standard Oil made an announcement that it intended to raise
its prices to effect an end to the existing price war. The court concluded
that the defendants' actions did not automatically constitute a conspir-
acy. Rather, they were entitled to act as their interests dictated, so long
as the act did not stem from an understanding or agreement.15 Thus,
Standard Oil also teaches that parallel behavior alone is rarely sufficient
ground on which to find a conspiracy.1
6
There has been, however, at least one case in relatively recent Sev-
enth Circuit history (1974-75 term) in which the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged conspiratorial action were compelling enough to
warrant an inference of conspiracy. In United States v. Finis P. Ernest,
Inc.,17 the defendant contractor submitted a construction bid which was
rejected for being too high. In this first round of bidding, defendant Er-
nest bid alone; however, in the second round both defendant Ernest and
defendant Modem participated. The plaintiff asked the court to consider
several circumstantial facts regarding this second round of bidding in
determining whether a conspiracy existed. First, seven of the sixteen
items and corresponding price quotes in the defendants' bids were identi-
cal, while the remainder of Modern's quotes were only slightly higher.
Furthermore, of those nine remaining quotes, seven of Modem's were the
same as Ernest's quotes rounded to a higher figure, while another differed
by exactly one dollar. Finally, Modern had other obligations which
would have made acceptance of this job impossible if awarded.1 8 Thus,
on the basis of these circumstances, the court found the evidence was
substantial enough to support the jury's implicit finding that the defend-
13. In Quality Auto, specifically, the testimony and affidavits stated that claim handling proce-
dures were developed unilaterally. Id. at 1200.
14. 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963).
15. Id. at 896.
16. In both Quality Auto and Standard Oil, the Seventh Circuit quoted from Theatre Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954), in which the United States
Supreme Court stated that it "has never held that proof of parallel business behavior . . . itself
constitutes a Sherman Act offense."
17. 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
18. Id. at 1262.
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ants had conspired.' 9
Quality Auto, Standard Oil and Ernest taken together illustrate that
the Seventh Circuit has historically placed a heavy burden of proof on a
plaintiff attempting to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. Fur-
thermore, this term, in O'Byrne, the court acted entirely consistent with
these prior findings by refusing to accept a presumption of concerted ac-
tivity on the basis of a stockholder's relationship.
B. Restraint of Trade
The United States Supreme Court recently stated that a literal read-
ing and application of the Sherman Act § 1 would serve to invalidate the
"entire body of private contract law."' 20 In effect, the Act makes illegal
any conduct which restrains trade, provided only that it involve some
form of concerted activity and has a connection with interstate com-
merce. 2' For this reason, the Act was long ago tempered significantly by
what has been termed the "rule of reason."' 22 This rule calls for an exam-
ination of the reasonableness of the effect of the challenged restraint on
competition. 23 There is, however, an exception to the rule which would
make a restraint illegal even without a showing of an anticompetitive
effect. That is, some activity is considered so destructive of free competi-
tion that the requisite suppression of competition is presumed and the
activity is found to be a "per se" antitrust violation. 24 In the 1983-84
term, the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to discuss both rule of
reason and per se antitrust violations.
1. Per Se Applications
Although the Seventh Circuit has had many occasions to consider
whether a particular activity constituted a per se Sherman Act viola-
19. Id. at 1261. The court quoted from Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), in
which the Supreme Court stated that participation in a conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence, but rather may be inferred from a collection of circumstances.
20. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978).
21. See supra note 1.
22. The rule of reason was articulated in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918), in which the United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. at 238. Although this test was
not expressly labelled the "rule of reason" in Chicago Bd. of Trade, subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have entitled it so. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 691 (1978).
23. Id. at 688.
24. Some of the practices found to be per se illegal are price fixing, division of markets, group
boycotts, and tying arrangements. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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tion,25 it had never before detailed the manner in which the question
should be submitted to a jury. However, during the 1983-84 term, in
Wilk v. AMA ,26 the court offered a general format to be followed in such
cases. Furthermore, the court addressed the more specific question of
when a boycott might constitute a per se violation.
In Wilk, various chiropractors sued a number of medical associa-
tions and doctors, 27 claiming a conspiracy and consequent group boycott
to eliminate the chiropractic profession. The group boycott was alleg-
edly implemented through an agreement to: (1) induce medical doctors,
hospitals and other health care facilities to forego any form of profes-
sional, research, or educational association with chiropractors, and (2)
induce prospective patients to avoid seeking chiropractic services. 28 The
impetus for this boycott was allegedly Principle 3 of the AMA Principles
of Medical Ethics which provides that a "physician should practice a
method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not volun-
tarily associate with anyone who violates this principle."
'29
At the plaintiffs' request, the issue of whether the boycott consti-
tuted a § 1 violation was submitted to the jury by means of per se instruc-
tions which were paraphrased by the Seventh Circuit as follows:
(1) To establish per se unlawfulness, plaintiffs were obliged to show:
25. See, e.g., Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104
S. Ct. 1404 (1984); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.
1981); Trabert and Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp., 633 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1980); Ohio-Sealy
Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979);
Moraine Products v. ICI America, Inc., 538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
26. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984).
27. The defendants in Wilk included the AMA, the American Hospital Association, the Ameri-
can College of Surgeons, the American College of Physicians, the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals, the American College of Radiology, the American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, the Illinois State Medical Society, H. Doyl Taylor (director of the AMA Department of
Investigation and secretary to the AMA Committee on Quackery), Joseph A. Sabatier, M.D. and H.
Thomas Ballantine, M.D. (both served on the AMA Committee on Quackery) and James H. Sam-
mons, M.D. (member of the AMA Board of Trustees).
28. 719 F.2d at 211. In 1963, the AMA Board of Trustees established a "Committee on Quack-
ery" which considered "its prime mission to be, first, the containment of chiropractic and ultimately,
the elimination of chiropractic." Id. at 213, quoting from, a memorandum to AMA Board of Trust-
ees from Committee on Quackery, January 4, 1971. Thus, the Committee, along with the AMA's
Department of Investigation, prepared and distributed numerous publications which were critical of
chiropractic. In addition, the Committee was extensively involved in state and national legislative
lobbying regarding chiropractic licensing and Medicaid/Medicare reimbursement for chiropractic
services. Furthermore, the Committee sent letters warning medical boards and associations that
professional cooperation between chiropractors and physicians was unethical. And finally, the Joint
Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals, of which a number of defendant organizations were mem-
bers, issued a manual which "asserted that a hospital permitting chiropractors to use its facilities
would 'very probably' lose its accreditation." Id. at 213-14.
29. Id. at 213. In 1966, the AMA resolved that it "is the position of the medical profession that
chiropractic is an unscientific cult whose practitioners lack the necessary training and background to
diagnose and treat human disease."
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(a) that defendants entered into 'a concerted refusal to deal, en-
gaged in by the participants primarily or in large part for the pur-
pose of excluding competitors from the market'; and (b) 'that the
primary motivations for this refusal to deal were essentially com-
mercial or economic in nature.'
(3) [I]f you find that any of the boycott conspiracies which plaintiffs
have alleged were entered into to contain or eliminate chiroprac-
tors or to injure them in their ability to compete. . . you may not
consider whether the resulting restraint of trade was
reasonable .... '30
The court held that these instructions were erroneous because they
inadequately detailed the conduct which, if found to have occurred,
would amount to a per se violation.3 ' Furthermore, the instructions im-
posed upon the jury not only the burden of determining whether the al-
leged conduct occurred (which is properly its function), but also whether
the conduct itself constitutes a per se violation. Because this latter deter-
mination is one of law, it is properly within the realm of the court.
32
Thus, the Seventh Circuit articulated the proper procedure to be fol-
lowed henceforth: First, the trial judge must determine whether the al-
leged conduct (e.g. "A, B, C, and D") would constitute a per se violation;
Second, if he determines that it would, he must then instruct the jury
that it could find a per se violation occurred "only if it found that a
particular defendant had done A, B, C, and D."
'33
"A concerted refusal to deal" (instruction 1) and "any of the boy-
cott conspiracies which plaintiffs have alleged" (instruction 3) were
found to be insufficient descriptions of conduct on the basis of which a
jury could find a per se violation. 34 However, the court went even fur-
ther and held that the issue of this particular boycott should not have
been submitted to the jury under a per se analysis. In so holding, the
court reiterated its position that "boycotts are illegal per se only if used
to enforce agreements that are themselves illegal per se-for example
price fixing agreements." '35 Thus, because the boycott here was the end
to be achieved, as opposed to the means through which a potentially ille-
30. Id. at 220.
31. However, the court concluded that the error was not prejudicial to plaintiffs because the
trial court should not have acceded to plaintiffs' request (over defendants' objection) to submit the
per se question to the jury. Id. at 221. See also text accompanying notes 35-37.
32. 719 F.2d at 220.
33. Id.
34. The court suggested that in this case, descriptions such as "refusal to refer patients," "de-
nial of access to hospitals" and "closing doors of educational programs" were required. Id. at 220.
35. Id. at 221, quoting from, Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d
1488, 1495 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984), and citing, United States Trotting
Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 787-90 (7th Cir. 1981).
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gal end would be achieved, 36 the anticompetitive effect was adjudged so
uncertain as to require analysis under the rule of reason.
37
The Wilk decision is consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent inso-
far as the court has previously manifested a reluctance to label an activity
a "group boycott" and consequently conclude that a per se presumption
of anticompetitive effect may be made.38 For instance, in United States
Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 39 the plaintiff (USTA) was a non-
profit organization dedicated to the establishment of uniform rules and
standards in harness racing which were promulgated to alleviate wide-
spread problems associated with the sport. In order to protect the sys-
tem from those who sought to undermine it, two of the rules provided
sanctions against members who raced at tracks unaffiliated with the
USTA. These sanctions were imposed against the defendant race tracks
because they attempted to undermine the USTA system by ceasing pay-
ment of dues while continuing to enjoy the benefits of membership. The
defendants contended that the enforcement of the USTA rules against
them amounted to a group boycott and was thus illegal.
40
In United States Trotting, the court refused to find a per se violation
because the express goal of the USTA rules was not to exclude competi-
tors, but to ensure honest harness racing.41 Similarly, in Wilk, the ex-
press goal of the AMA was not to eliminate competition, but to ensure
competent patient care. 42 Thus, the Seventh Circuit has demonstrated
that when a group boycott does not seek to eliminate competition, the
activity must be analyzed under the rule of reason to determine whether
the resulting restraint is unreasonable.
2. Rule of Reason Applications
The rule of reason, as articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,43 has traditionally al-
lowed consideration of "[t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or
end sought to be attained." 44 However, the Court went on to explain
36. For instance, if the boycott were used to compel someone to engage in illegal economic
behavior such as price fixing, then the boycott would be illegal per se. 719 F.2d at 221.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Phil Tolkan Datsun v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers Ass'n, 672 F.2d 1280
(7th Cir. 1982); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981).
39. 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981).
40. Id. at 783-87.
41. Id. at 788-89.
42. See supra note 29.
43. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
44. Id. at 238.
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that these factors may be considered, not because a showing of good in-
tention "will save an otherwise objectionable regulation," but rather be-
cause "knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences. ' 45 Nevertheless, three years ago, in United States
Trotting,46 the Seventh Circuit used language that seemed to indicate a
willingness to depart somewhat from the teachings of Chicago Board of
Trade. In short, the court in United States Trotting cautioned against
zealous use of per se determinations in group boycott situations for two
reasons-first, because they preclude inquiry into the business necessity
for the practice involved, and second, because they do not allow a consid-
eration of whether the conduct went beyond the restraint necessary to
accomplish whatever legitimate purpose is asserted.
47
United States Trotting was remanded for consideration of the alleged
illegal activity under the rule of reason. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
did not address the issue of whether the motivation for the USTA's sanc-
tions could justify a finding of reasonableness even though such activity
under other circumstances would constitute a Sherman Act violation.
The opportunity to address this issue arose two years later when the de-
fendant in MCI Communications Corp. v. AT& T 48 argued that under the
rule of reason the trier-of-fact must consider all of the facts and circum-
stances bearing on the reasonableness of the conduct. The court's re-
sponse to this argument, however, seemed effectively to close the opening
made in United States Trotting. The court stated that the rule of reason
confines consideration to the impact of the conduct on competitive con-
ditions and does not allow inquiry into whether a policy favoring compe-
tition is in the public interest. Thus, the teachings of Chicago Board of
Trade apparently remained intact until the opening of the 1983-84 term.
By the close of the 1983-84 term, the tension between United States
Trotting and MCI was completely resolved. In Wilk v. AMA,49 the Sev-
enth Circuit expressly modified the rule of reason test for cases involving
questions of medical ethics. Consideration of intent may now influence a
finding of reasonableness. The court felt that this landmark decision was
possible because the Supreme Court reserved "freedom to discriminate
between nonprofessional and professional activities, in construing and
applying the Act."' 50 Thus, although the modification at present is
45. Id.
46. 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981).
47. Id. at 790.
48. 708 F.2d 1081, 1138-39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983).
49. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984). (See notes 27-29 and
accompanying text for the facts of the case).
50. Id. at 226. In support of its statement, the Seventh Circuit quoted from Goldfarb v. Virginia
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strictly applicable only in cases involving medical ethics, there is reason
to believe that the result in Wilk will eventually be extended to include
cases involving other public service professions.
The new test requires plaintiffs to demonstrate, as before, that com-
petition is restricted. If plaintiffs are successful, a prima facie showing
has been made that the restraint was unreasonable. Defendants then
have the burden of rebutting the presumption of unreasonableness 51 by
showing: first, that they are genuinely concerned about the use of scien-
tific methods in the care of all their patients; second, that this concern is
objectively reasonable; third, that this concern was the motivating factor
behind the conduct intended to implement Principle 3 of the AMA Prin-
ciples of Medical Ethics;52 and fourth, that this concern could not have
been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition. If
defendants successfully meet this burden, then the conduct is deemed
reasonable and no Sherman Act § 1 violation will be found.53
In Wilk, the jury verdict for the defendants was reversed and the
case remanded for consideration under this interpretation of the rule of
reason. 54 On remand, the defendants' greatest difficulty in sustaining a
finding of reasonableness will be presented by the first of the four require-
ments outlined above: that is, whether the various defendants were moti-
vated by a concern that scientific method be used in the care of their
patients. In this regard, the court identified three possible motives be-
hind the defendants' conduct, two of which would not support a finding
of reasonableness. First, they could have been acting to eliminate compe-
tition and thereby increase profits (the "money motive"). Second, they
could have been acting in the public interest to eliminate the "threat"
posed by chiropractic to public health, safety and welfare (the "public
interest motive"). Third, they could have been acting to avoid jeopardiz-
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n. 17 (1975), in which the Supreme Court stated that: "The public
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another contest, be treated differ-
ently." Note that United States Trotting in effect dealt with a public service profession, while MCI
did not. This fact likely explains why the court seemed willing to consider motivation and effect in
the former, but not the latter.
51. Defendants' burden does not constitute an affirmative defense and therefore need not be
pleaded. 719 F.2d at 227.
52. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
53. 719 F.2d at 227.
54. Id. at 229. Although the district court itself departed from precedent by allowing the jury
to consider the defendants' motives under the rule of reason, the Seventh Circuit held that the jury
instructions were prejudicially erroneous in two respects. First, they did not clearly define what
motives could be found acceptable under the modified test (see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying
text); and second, they did not define the manner in which the motive was to be weighed (e.g., the
least restrictive means requirement).
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ing the health of their personal patients by refusing to associate profes-
sionally in their care with those who do not practice a scientific method
(the "patient care motive")."
The money motive would be found unacceptable because a desire to
eliminate competition in an effort to realize greater profit does nothing to
advance the public interest and therefore does not satisfy the modified
test. Similarly, the public interest motive would be deemed unacceptable
because a determination of whether chiropractic threatens the general
public can be made only by Congress and state legislatures. However,
the court implies that if the patient care motive were found to be the
defendants' true concern, their activities would then be justified.
5 6
Although motivation was found to be a proper concern in Wilk, a
discussion of motivation would not be justified in the majority of Sher-
man § 1 cases.5 7 For instance, in another rule of reason case decided dur-
ing the 1983-84 term, Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms,
Inc.,58 the court was not confronted with a professional activity. There-
fore, the alleged illegal conduct was analyzed by the one-step rule of rea-
son as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chicago Board
of Trade.59 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
finding and held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a Sherman
Act § 1 cause of action because no anticompetitive effect was alleged. 60
Bunker Ramo serves to illustrate the proposition, as advanced in
earlier Seventh Circuit cases, that pleadings will not be construed so lib-
erally as to infer material elements of an antitrust cause of action. 6' This
particular case involved an alleged conspiracy to "fix the price" of forms
sold to Bunker Ramo at an "artificially high, non-competitive price."'62
The alleged violation involved the ordering of forms from the defendant
by one of the plaintiff's employees who had been bribed for his participa-
tion in the scheme. Although the forms were never delivered, the plain-
tiff's employee submitted falsified invoices for the orders on which the
55. Id. at 219.
56. Id. at 228.
57. Except to the extent that knowledge of intent is used to interpret facts and predict conse-
quences. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Seventh Circuit
limited use of the modified test to cases "involving a certain kind of question of ethics for the medical
profession." 719 F.2d at 226.
58. 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
59. See supra note 22. The traditional Chicago Bd. of Trade one-step rule makes illegal any
restraint that suppresses competition. 246 U.S. at 238.
60. 713 F.2d at 1285.
61. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
62. 713 F.2d at 1279.
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plaintiff relied in paying the defendant for the non-delivered forms. 63 On
the basis of these facts and the "bare allegation" that the plaintiff was
charged an "artificially high, non-competitive price," the court refused to
find that an anticompetitive effect sufficient to satisfy the rule of reason
had been claimed.
Similiar pleadings in past terms have been found insufficient to state
an antitrust cause of action. For instance, in Havoco of America, Ltd. v.
Shell Oil Co. ,64 the plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy were deemed con-
clusionary because no supporting facts were claimed. In fact, the record
was devoid of any allegations upon which the court could even infer that
a conspiracy existed. 65 Such a conclusionary charge of conspiracy also
defeated the plaintiff's pleadings in Fabert Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co. 66 for the same reason. Thus, even though the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require mere notice pleading, 67 the Seventh Circuit has
demonstrated a reluctance to find that a cause of action has been made
out when an antitrust element has not been pleaded specifically and sup-
ported with some factual allegation.
68
Wilk and Bunker Ramo addressed relatively generalized issues re-
garding the rule of reason. Wilk dealt with a modification of the require-
ments of the test itself, while Bunker Ramo dealt with the sufficiency of
an allegation required to meet the test. The last rule of reason case to be
discussed below, however, was different in that it dealt with a specific
category of activity and required a determination of whether the alleged
conduct fit within that category such that it would be held unreasonable.
3. Tying
During the 1983-84 term, Johnson v. Nationwide Industries, Inc.69
presented the court with its first opportunity to determine whether a ty-
ing arrangement 70 exists between the sale of a condominium unit and
63. Id. at 1275.
64. 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1980).
65. Id. at 558.
66. 355 F.2d 888, 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939 (1966).
67. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
68. Most likely the court requires seemingly higher standards of pleading due to the particu-
larly high stakes involved in antitrust actions (i.e. treble damages). However, the court granted
Bunker Ramo leave to amend, 713 F.2d at 1285, thus demonstrating that it is concerned that such
grave charges be heard if there is some demonstrated basis to them.
69. 715 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. A tying arrangement conditions the sale of a tying product upon the buyer's purchase of a
distinct tied product. Because the arrangement tends to eliminate competition for the tied product,
it is generally held illegal as creating a per se anticompetitive effect. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958).
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requisite share of a building management contract 7 when the manage-
ment contract is entered into by the developer on behalf of future pur-
chasers before the building has reached full capacity. The only issue
involved in this case was whether such a sale involved one product or
two. In isolating the two possible outcomes, the court stated that it
could either find: (1) a presumption that one product exists, which is
rebuttable by a showing that the contract runs for a reasonable length of
time; or (2) that there are two tied products forming a lawful arrange-
ment provided the contract runs for a reasonable length of time. 72 Thus,
in either case a finding of lawfulness would be dependent upon the rea-
sonableness of the contract's duration. Citing authority from similar
condominium cases on both sides of the issue,73 the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, 74 and held that in such cases only one product is involved,
provided the contract is of reasonable duration.
75
The result in Johnson demonstrates the Seventh Circuit's willingness
to consider the economic realities involved in as well as the public bene-
fits to be gained from a tying situation before ruling on its legality vis-a-
vis a restraint of trade. Some of the realities and benefits considered in
Johnson were: (1) that "[p]rospective purchasers are reluctant to
purchase in a building not professionally managed"; (2) that "proper
management helps protect the developer against loss in value of unsold
unit"; and (3) that "[lenders generally require such contractual arrange-
ments."' 76 In Johnson, these considerations led the court to a construc-
tive determination that a tying arrangement did not exist. Similarly, in
71. A condominium unit purchaser buys, in addition to his unit, a tenancy in common in the
shared areas which include hallways, elevators and ground. He therefore must pay a percentage of
the cost to maintain these areas. 715 F.2d at 1234 n. 3.
72. Id. at 1237. Although the latter result might appear somewhat unorthodox given that tying
arrangements have been characterized as per se violations, as a practical matter courts have been
willing to "consider justifications for the challenged conduct in an analysis of economic effect."
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 77 (2d ed. 1984).
73. Foster v. West Alexandria Properties, Inc., 1980-1 CCH Trade Cases T 63,223 (E.D. Va.
1980) (holding that only one product was sold); Jones v. 247 East Chestnut Properties, 1975-2 CCH
Trade Cases 60,491 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding that two products were sold).
74. 715 F.2d at 1237. The district court also had concluded that the reasonableness of the
management contract was a factual issue. Id. at 1235.
75. Id. at 1237. In Johnson, the contract was to extend five years beyond the date the building
reached 80% occupancy. Id. at 1235. However, because this case was an appeal of a denial of
summary judgment, the court had no need to determine whether five years beyond 80% occupancy
was a reasonable duration. In Foster, 1980-1 CCH Trade Cases 63,223, eleven months beyond
75% occupancy was held reasonable, while in Jones, 1975-2 CCH Trade Cases 60,491, five years
beyond 100% occupancy was held unreasonable. Given that the duration in Johnson falls within
these two examples, even if the court continued to rely on their authority, it is difficult to anticipate
which way the Seventh Circuit would rule should the issue of reasonable duration come before it.
76. 715 F.2d at 1236.
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an earlier Seventh Circuit case, FE.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago,7 7 the court found by applying the rule of reason test
that a copyright licensing system did not constitute a tying arrange-
ment.78 However, before reaching this result using a restraint of trade
analysis, the court undertook a fairly extensive exposition of the benefits
to be gained from such an arrangement. 79 Although the rule of reason
analysis set forth substantiated the determination that no tying arrange-
ment existed, the lengthy commentary devoted to the arrangement's vir-
tues tends to suggest that a different result might have been reached if it
were not so beneficial. Accordingly, the result in Johnson is philosoph-
ically consistent with prior Seventh Circuit reasoning.
In general, the restraint of trade cases considered by the Seventh
Circuit in the 1983-84 term produced some significant results, including:
(1) a newly defined procedure for submitting the per se question to the
jury (Wilk); (2) a substantial modification of the rule of reason test
(Wilk); and (3) the determination that an arrangement held in other cir-
cuits to involve tying is not automatically to be so considered in the Sev-
enth Circuit (Johnson).
C. Interstate Commerce Nexus
Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc. ,80 was discussed
above in connection with the restraint of trade requirement under the
rule of reason.8 ' However, the court actually began its Sherman Act
analysis with a discussion of the interstate commerce nexus. The activity
which allegedly violated the antitrust laws involved the fictitious delivery
of forms for which the plaintiff paid the defendant. In a motion to dis-
miss, the defendants argued that because the forms were neither deliv-
ered nor intended to be delivered, they did not involve or affect interstate
77. 1982-1 CCH Trade Cases 73,460 (7th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 73,465-66. The plaintiff had originally licensed to Catholic parishes the right to
copy songs for use in their hymnals at a rate of two cents per copy. As a result of widespread
infringement, the plaintiff instituted its Annual Copying License (ACL) which was at issue in F EL
Publications. The ACL allows copying of an unlimited number of the songs offered by plaintiff for a
single fee of $100 per year regardless of the number of songs used. Id. at 73,461. The district court
found that the ACL involved a tying arrangement because in order to license the plaintiff's most
popular songs, the defendant had to license the less popular songs as well. Id. at 73,464.
79. Id. at 73,465. The Seventh Circuit noted that this arrangement was a "reasonable and
flexible tool for dealing with the unique problems associated with the Roman Catholic liturgical
music market." Specifically, it protects and compensates copyright holders, allows parishes to pro-
duce reasonably priced hymnals, and obviates the need to monitor each customer for possible in-
fringing activities. Id.
80. 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
81. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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commerce.8 2 The district court denied the motion to dismiss on this is-
sue and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 83 However, in holding that there
was an allegation of an interstate commerce nexus sufficient to justify a
trial on this issue, the Seventh Circuit expressly reserved judgment on the
question of the type of activity which will satisfy the requirement.84
Two categories of activity have been identified by the courts and
found to satisfy section 1 of the Sherman Act when they affect interstate
commerce: (1) the challenged activity itself, and (2) the defendant's gen-
eral business activity independent of the violation. While many jurisdic-
tions accept that only the former activity must affect interstate commerce
before a Sherman Act violation will be found,85 there are those which
will additionally accept the latter category. 86  Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has never clearly articulated whether a business which
engages in a local conspiracy can be held liable under federal antitrust
laws because that business also engages in interstate commerce.87 Conse-
quently, the Seventh Circuit has demonstrated a reluctance to do so.
The Seventh Circuit's reluctance to rule on the issue of whether a
defendant's general business activity is sufficient to satisfy the interstate
commerce requirement is evidenced by the fact that this is not the first
term in which the court has reserved judgment on the matter. In 1975,
the court stated that it need not resolve the issue at that time because it
was convinced that there was sufficient evidence in that case to support a
finding of jurisdiction under either approach.88 As of 1975, however, the
court seemed to lean toward a requirement that the restraint itself act
upon interstate commerce because of past Supreme Court language bear-
82. 713 F.2d at 1280.
83. Id. at 1289-90. The complaint was dismissed on other grounds with leave to amend. See
text accompanying notes 59-60.
84. 713 F.2d at 1282.
85. See Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983); Crane v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Cordova & Simonpietri Ins.
Agency v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981).
86. See Construction Aggregate Transport, Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., 710 F.2d 752 (1 1th
Cir. 1983); Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). Note that the district court in Bunker Ramo relied on Western Waste
in holding that a sufficient allegation of interstate commerce nexus had been made. 713 F.2d at
1280.
87. In Bunker Ramo, the court explained that the more recent cases taking an opposing stand
on this issue are each interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in McClain v. Real Estate Bd. of
New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980): "To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman
Act violation it would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate
commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activity." Some have narrowly interpreted this lan-
guage to mean that only the challenged activity will be considered, while others believe that room is
left for the defendant's business activities to be considered. 713 F.2d at 1280-82.
88. United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 893 (1975).
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ing on the issue.8 9 Only time will tell which position the Seventh Circuit
will finally adopt.
II. ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT § 2A: PRICE DISCRIMINATION
O'Byrne v. Cheker Oil Co.90 was decided during the 1983-84 term
and discussed above in connection with the conspiracy requirement of a
Sherman Act § 1 violation.91 In that regard, the court merely applied
new facts to established law and therefore the case was not terribly signif-
icant. However, in analyzing the plaintiffs' Robinson-Patman Act count,
new precedent was established in the circuit.
The plaintiffs in O'Byrne attempted to prove that Cheker had prac-
ticed price discrimination in the sale of gasoline between its independent
dealers (plaintiffs) and its company-owned dealers in violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act § 2A.92 However, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
district court's summary judgment in the defendants' favor because the
Act requires a discrimination in price between different purchasers.
93
Although the plaintiffs' allegation implied that the independent and com-
pany-owned dealers constituted two categories of different purchasers,
94
Security Tire and Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co.,95 was cited to support
the proposition that Cheker's company-owned dealers were not purchas-
ers. Security Tire held that for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act a
parent cannot sell to its wholly-owned subsidiaries because they are one
and the same entity.96 Therefore, Cheker's only purchasers were the
plaintiffs between whom there was no evidence of discrimination.
97
O'Byrne turned on whether a parent and its wholly-owned subsidi-
ary could be considered separate corporate entities such that goods could
89. Id. at 1260.
90. 727 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1984).
91. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
92. In relevant part, section 2A of the Robinson-Patman Act states that it is "unlawful ... to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality." The
Act also includes restraint and interstate commerce requirements which were not at issue in
O'Byrne. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1982).
93. 727 F.2d at 164-65. The court cited American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 508 F.2d 1345, 1353
(10th Cir. 1975), to support the proposition that "there is no violation unless discrimination is in
price between different purchasers on the same level of competition." See also Chicago Sugar Co. v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950), which
states that "[t]here must be proof that a seller has charged one purchaser a higher price for like
goods than he charged one or more of the purchaser's competitors."
94. The plaintiffs attempted to support their Robinson-Patman Act count by comparing the
retail prices charged by company-owned stations with the wholesale prices charged by Cheker to the
plaintiffs. 727 F.2d at 164.
95. 598 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
96. Id. at 967.
97. 727 F.2d at 164.
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be "sold" as opposed to transferred by the parent to the subsidiary. The
result here establishes that they cannot be so considered. Indeed, past
Seventh Circuit opinions have agreed with this result in the context of
the Sherman Act,98 barring one important exception. In Independence
Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp. ,99 the court held that enough separation
was shown between the two defendant entities such that they could be
considered independent and thus capable of conspiring for purposes of
Sherman Act § 1.100 Presumably, the same considerations would have
led the court to reach a similar result in dealing with a question of Robin-
son-Patman discrimination, by finding that a parent and its wholly-
owned subsidiary could under certain circumstances be capable of a
buyer/seller relationship.
Of course, O'Byrne did not present the court with the opportunity to
decide whether this proposition is true because Cheker and its company-
owned stations were closely associated in their business dealings. Fur-
thermore, whatever predilection the court might have felt toward reach-
ing this result has been nullified by the Supreme Court in its recent
reversal of Independence Tube. t0t In reversing Independence Tube, the
Supreme Court held that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary must
always be viewed as a single enterprise for purposes of the Sherman Act
§ 1.102 Therefore, O'Byrne and Independence Tube together indicate that
the Seventh Circuit will never consider a parent and its wholly-owned
subsidiary to be separate entities for purposes of a Robinson-Patman
price discrimination count.
98. See University Life Ins. Co. of America v. Unimarc, Ltd., 699 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1983);
Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1980); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat
Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); PermaLife Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 134 (1968). In each of these
cases, the unitary nature of parents and affiliates was discussed in relation to their ability to conspire
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Although in each case the court held that the defendants were
incapable of such a conspiracy because they were not sufficiently distinct entities, it did state in each
case in dicta that under some circumstances a parent/subsidiary conspiracy was possible.
99. 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
100. Id. at 320. Among the factors which influenced the court to determine that defendant
Copperweld was capable of conspiring with its subsidiary were: (1) that they engaged in completely
separate businesses; (2) that the subsidiary had real autonomy in day-to-day and policy decisions;
(3) that the subsidiary's expenses and revenues were segregated; and (4) that the subsidiary had a
separate sales force and clientele.
101. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
102. Id. at 2742. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address the activity of a
parent and its subsidiary in terms of the Robinson-Patman Act, the reasons set forth for the result
indicate that in future it will be construed as relating to this Act: "A parent and its wholly-owned
subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their gen-
eral corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but
one."
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III. RES JUDICATA OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS
The result in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Sur-
geons 10 3 represents an extremely significant departure from established
case precedent regarding the availability of federal antitrust claims. In
Marrese, the plaintiffs brought suit in state court claiming that the Illi-
nois common law and the Illinois constitution required that the defend-
ant Academy grant a hearing on their applications for membership,
which had been previously rejected without a hearing or a statement of
reasons. The suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim. After the
appellate review process resulted in an affirmance, the plaintiffs brought
suit in federal court alleging a Sherman Act § 1 violation resulting from
the defendant's monopolistic practice. 1°4 The question before the Sev-
enth Circuit was whether the plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the prior state action. In a
plurality decision that motivated a lengthy concurrence and an even
lengthier dissent, the court held that the action was barred because the
antitrust claims could either have been heard in state court along with
the other claims or brought contemporaneously in federal court. 0 5
The holding in Marrese marks an admitted disavowal of authority
from a great number of jurisdictions, 106 including a case directly on point
which was decided by the Seventh Circuit itself.107 Historically, as the
dissent notes, the doctrine of res judicata bars litigation of an issue which
has been adjudicated by a court of "competent" jurisdiction, 0 8 as well as
those claims which "could have been brought in a prior litigation between
the same parties arising from the same cause of action."' 0 9 In this case,
however, the plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims could not have been brought
103. 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984).
104. Id. at 1151.
105. Id. at 1156. Because certiorari has been granted, the Seventh Circuit's somewhat extraordi-
nary holding may not stand.
106. Id. at 1153. The court cites the following cases and sources to demonstrate that there is
"much authority that is at least superficially contrary": RX Data Corp. v. Department of Social
Servs., 684 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1982); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 841 (1975); Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26, illustration 2 (1980).
107. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979): "Defendants' arguments that the antitrust claims have been
adjudicated in state court proceedings are insupportable both because the state courts have not in
fact purported to do so, and because jurisdiction of federal antitrust suits is exclusively in the federal
courts."
108. 726 F.2d at 1175 (Cudahy J., dissenting), quoting from, Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897).
109. 726 F.2d at 1178 (Cudahy, J., dissenting), citing, Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 398 (1981).
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in the prior state proceedings because only federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over federal antitrust laws. 110 The court's answer to this difficulty is
that the plaintiffs had the opportunity to bring their antitrust claims
under Illinois antitrust law because, as far as these particular plaintiffs
were concerned, the liability standards under both Illinois and federal
antitrust statutes are the same. Moreover, the court stated that although
the available damages differ, that distinction is not important since these
particular plaintiffs were not seeking damages, but rather to be admitted
to the defendant association. " I I
Of course, if the plaintiffs did not wish to have their antitrust claims
heard in state court, other alternatives were available to them. For in-
stance, they could have brought an antitrust action in federal court with
pendent state claims, or they could have brought simultaneous federal
and state actions. 1t2 The practical procedural effect of the holding in
Marrese is that plaintiffs in general must now consider from the outset
bringing two suits, one in a federal and one in a state forum, if they do
not wish to bring a state antitrust suit along with their state claims. Fur-
thermore, if a plaintiff is unsure about bringing an antitrust suit, caution
dictates that he bring the federal suit to "cover all bases." The result is
that defendants in general may be faced with antitrust suits that might
never have been brought had plaintiffs not been concerned about losing
the future potential for a suit. Ironically, the result in Bunker Ramo
discussed above (case dismissed for insufficient allegations of anticompe-
titive effect) 1 3 suggests that the court is reluctant to undertake adjudica-
tions of antitrust claims unless there is a firm base upon which the case is
built from the outset, while the result in Marrese sanctions the bringing
110. Although the court questions whether courts actually do have exclusive jurisdiction over
federal antitrust laws, it concedes that only the Supreme Court may determine whether a Sherman
Act claim may be brought in state court. Id. at 1152-53.
111. Id. at 1153-56. The court relied on Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d
484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981), in which res judicata was held to bar a federal
antitrust claim filed after the failure of a state antitrust action. However, in Nash, the state antitrust
statute was identical to the federal statute, while in Marrese the laws were not identical. For in-
stance, in Illinois a boycott is never illegal per se, while in federal court it is often a per se violation.
See supra at n.24. Furthermore, in Illinois there is no automatic trebling of damages if an activity is
found anticompetitive by the rule of reason as opposed to per se reasoning. Nevertheless, the court
held that these distinctions were not important in Marrese because the plaintiffs in effect had charged
a conspiracy to fix prices or limit output which are both per se offenses under both Illinois and
federal law. Thus, in Marrese the liability standards were the same, and although the potential
remedies were different, the distinction was held inconsequential because the plaintiffs were not seek-
ing damages (as evidenced by the fact that they did not seek damages in the original state proceed-
ings). Id. at 1155-56.
112. Id. at 1152.
113. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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of an increased number of suits. 114
In sum, the 1983-84 term produced a number of significant antitrust
holdings which indicate a willingness to break away from established
precedent in order to reach a desired end.
114. Actually, the court hoped to reduce the number of suits brought by invoking the doctrine of
res judicata and thus "insisting that people litigate their claims in an economical and parsimonious
fashion." Id. at 1153. Furthermore, the court has clearly broken with precedent in order to enforce
the spirit, but not the law, of res judicata which is to "protect a defendant from being worn down by
a plaintiff who sues him over and over again for the same allegedly wrongful conduct." Id.

